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ABSTRACT:  We analyze reputation in a game between a patient player 1 and a non-
myopic but less patient opponent, player 2. Player 1’s type is private information and he 
may be a "commitment type" who is locked into playing a particular strategy. We assume 
that players do not directly observe each other' s action but rather see an imperfect signal 
of it. In particular, we assume that the support of the distribution of signals is independent 
of how player 2 plays. We show that in any Nash equilibrium of the game  player 1 will 
get a payoff close to the largest payoff consistent with player 2 choosing a best response 
in a finite truncation of the game. Moreover, we show that if the discount factor of player 
2 is sufficiently large then  player 1 will essentially get the maximum payoff consistent 
with player 2 getting at least his pure strategy minmax payoff in any Nash equilibrium.  
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1.  Introduction 
  We consider a game between a patient player 1 and a non-myopic but less patient 
opponent, player 2.  As usual in reputation models, we suppose that the patient player' s 
type is private information, and that he may be a "commitment type" who is locked in to 
playing  a  particular  strategy.   We investigate the extent to which an uncommitted or 
"normal"  type  of  patient  player  can  exploit  his  less  patient  opponent' s  uncertainty  to 
maintain a reputation for playing like a commitment type. 
  Most previous work on reputation effects has supposed that player 2 is in fact 
completely myopic, or equivalently that player 2 corresponds to a sequence of short run 
players  (see  Kreps  and  Wilson  [1982],  Milgrom  and  Roberts  [1982],  Fudenberg  and 
Levine [1989], [1992]).
3 Since a myopic player 2 will play a short-run best response in 
each period to that period' s expected play, the best possible commitment for the long run 
player is to the Stackelberg strategy for the corresponding static game. 
  This paper consider the patient player 1 has discount factor d 1 near 1, while his 
opponent  player 2 is an infinite-lived player who discounts future payoffs with a smaller 
discount factor d 2.  Perhaps the best way to interpret this assumption of unequal discount 
factors is to interpret the model as a shorthand for a situation where player 1 faces a large 
number of different but identical player 2’s, each of whom observe all previous play and 
who either alternate play, or play consecutively.   Under either interpetation, the key is 
that player 1 cares more about future payoffs of this game than player 2 does, because he 
will be playing in more future periods.
4  
   A game with a non-myopic opponent differs from one with a myopic opponent in 
two main ways. First, because a non-myopic opponent cares about future payoffs, the 
static Stackelberg strategy is no longer necessarily the best possible commitment:  Higher 
payoffs  can  sometimes  be  attained  by  the  use  of  rewards  and  punishments.  In  the 
prisoner' s  dilemma,  for  example,  "tit-for-tat"  is  a  better  commitment  against  a  non-
myopic opponent than the Stackelberg strategy of defecting. Second, it may be difficult to 
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demonstrate  that  one  is  using  a  strategy  with  rewards  and  punishments  unless  these 
rewards and punishments are occasionally carried out.  This is similar to the way in which 
incorrect  off-path  beliefs  can  weaken  reputation  effects in the play of extensive-form 
games against myopic opponents (Fudenberg and Levine [1989]).
5 
  Our main assumption is that  player 1 does not observe player 2' s intended action, 
but only sees an imperfect signal of it, as in a model of moral hazard.  Indeed, we assume 
that  the  support  of  the  distribution  of  signals  is  independent  of  how  player  2  plays. 
Intuitively, this ensures that player 1 will be called on to periodically use all rewards or 
punishments, thus eliminating the problem of player 2 misperceiving how player 1 would 
respond to a deviation.  As a result, player 1' s equilibrium payoff is bounded below by 
what he could get through commitment in the repeated game.  In particular, if player 2 is 
sufficiently patient, player 1 gets approximately the greatest feasible payoff consistent 
with the individual rationality of player 2.    
  This conclusion holds with an abitrarily small amount of noise. However, as the 
amount of noise shrinks, the patient player' s discount factor must be increasingly close to 
one to ensure that its Nash equilibrium payoff is close to its limit value.  Consequently, 
our result is of the most relevance when the amount of noise is “significant.”
6 
  The  first  general  study  of  reputation  with  two  non-myopic  players  is  Schmidt 
[1993],  who  studied  perfect  observability.  He  showed  that  the  long-run  player  can 
guarantee at least the payoff he would get from precommitment to a static strategy that 
minmaxes his opponent. This is good bound in some games, but in others, such as the 
prisoner' s  dilemma,  it  imposes  no  restrictions  beyond  those  implied  by  individual 
rationality.  Subsequently Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas [1993] provided tight bounds in 
the case of perfect observability; Cripps and Thomas [1994] provide the parallel result 
when both players have time-average payoffs. 
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  The key point is that with perfectly observed actions, the problem of off-path 
beliefs can prevent player 1 from obtaining the payoff he would most prefer.  Schmidt 
[1993] gives an example of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which player 2' s inability to 
learn the strategy played off the equilibrium path prevents player 1 from achieving the 
payoff he would get with a public committment.  Schmidt' s example is based on the 
presence  of  a  "perverse"  type  who  uses  a  history-dependent  strategy,  and  is 
indistinguishable from the "good" commitment type along the equilibrium path.  Cripps, 
Schmidt, and Thomas [1993] show that the perverse type is not required if we consider 
only Nash equilibria.  Their Theorem 3 applies to games with observed actions where the 
patient player is either "normal" or plays an arbitrary finitely-complex strategy.  It shows 
that there is a Nash equilibrium where player 1' s payoff is not substantially above the 
most he could obtain by playing a constant action, with player 2 choosing the individually 
rational response to this action that player 1 likes least.   
  Finally, we should acknowledge that Aoyagi [1994] independently obtains a result 
similar  to  ours for the case where player 1 maximizes his time-average payoff while 
player 2 discounts.  Aoyagi’s paper differs in interpreting the noise as “trembles,” and, 
more signifcantly, in considering a more complex class of “commitment types” that may 
be empty in some games, but the basic intuition for his results is the same. 
  To illustrate an application of our theorems, as well as how they differ from the 
bounds of Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas, we examine a version of the Prisoner' s Dilemma. 
It should be noted that the bound developed by Schmidt [1993] and by Cripps, Schmidt 
and Thomas [1993] does not imply any restriction on the Nash equilibria of this game:  
the best player 1 can get while minmaxing player 2 is his own minmax.  We start with a 
traditional prisoner' s dilemma. 
 
  C  D 
C  1,1  -1,2 
D  2,-1  0,0 
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We add incomplete observability, by supposing that if a player chooses a particular action 
then there is a small chance that the realized action will be different. In particular suppose 
that  conditional  on  choosing  action  C  (or  D)  the  realized  action  will  be  C  (D)  with 
probability 1-e and D (C) with probability  e .  For this example a simple calculation 
shows that the greatest socially feasible payoff for player 1 that gives player 2 at least the 
minmax is  3 2 2 / - e.  Our results imply that if the short run player is patient, then a 
patient long run player will receive a payoff close to 3/2 in every Nash equilibrium of this 
prisoner' s dilemma. (Note that this payoff can be achieved if player 2 always chooses C 
and player 1 alternates between C and D.) 
2. The Model 
  We consider a repeated game between two players, player 1 (the patient player) 
and player 2 (player 2).  We denote by  A A 1 2 ,  the finite (pure) action sets of the two 
players in the stage game with generic elements a a 1 2 , , and use a a 1 1 2 2 Î Î ￿ , ￿ A A  for mixed 
actions.  We denote by  A A , ￿ the corresponding spaces of profiles.  At the end of each 
period t =1 2 , ,￿ players commonly observe a stochastic outcome drawn from a finite set, 
y Y Î .  The probability distribution over outcomes depends on the action profile and is 
given as r( ) y a ; for mixed actions r a ( ) y  is defined in the obvious way. 
  Player 1  can be one of countably many types w ÎW.  These types are drawn from 
a common knowledge prior m assigning positive probability to all points in W.  Player 1  
is informed of his type before play begins, but this is purely private knowledge and is not 
revealed to player 2.  We focus on a particular type w0 ÎW, which we refer to as the 
rational type. 
  Stage game payoffs are u a y 1 1 ( , ) for the type w0 patient player and u a y 2 2 ( , ) for 
player 2.  It is also useful to define normal form payoffs by 
u a u a y y a i i i y ( ) ( , ) ( ) º￿ r  
with ui( ) a  defined in the obvious way.   
  In the repeated game the type w0 patient player seeks to maximize the average 
present value of utility using the discount factor  d1, while player 2 uses the discount 
factor  d2.    Types  of  player  1    other  than  type  w0  have  von  Neumann-Morgenstern   5 
preferences over sequences of player 1  actions and public outcomes, but these are not 
necessarily representable in a time separable form. 
  A type behavior strategy for player 1  or a behavior strategy for player 2 specifies 
a time indexed sequence of maps from private (for that player) and public histories to 
mixed actions (for that player).  We denote these by s1 and s2 respectively.  We also 
define ui
t( , ) s s 1 2  to be the corresponding period t expected utility. Finally, a behavior 
strategy for player 1  specifies a map from types to type behavior strategies.  A Nash 
equilibrium is a behavior strategy for each player such that given the opponent' s behavior 
strategy, no other behavior strategy yields a distribution over time sequences of actions 
(for that player) and public outcomes that is preferred to that in the proposed equilibrium.  
It is quite easy to show by taking limits of finite truncations of this infinite game that 
Nash equilibria exist.
7 Let  N1 1 2 ( , ) d d  denote the least (inf) expected payoff to player 1  
conditional on type w0 in any Nash equilibrium.   
  Say that a type behavior strategy for player 1 has bounded recall if there exists a 
number  N such that play at time t  is entirely determined by the history between t N -  
and  t -1.  A type of player 1  whose preferences make the type behavior strategy  s1  
strictly dominant is called committed to that strategy, and we write the type as w s ( ) 1 . 
  We make four key assumptions. 
Assumption  1:    If  s1  is  pure  bounded  recall  then  w s ( ) 1 ÎW,  that  is,  it  has  positive 
probability. 
Assumption 2:  If r a a r a a ( , ) ( , ) × = × ¢ 1 2 1 2 , then a a 1 1 = ¢. 
Assumption 3:  The support of r a ( ) ×  is independent of a2. 
Define the (pure strategy) minmax for player 2: 
u u a a a 2 2 1 2 º min max ( ). 
Assumption 4:  There exists a pure profile a such that u a u 2 2 ( ) > . 
  Assumption  1  ensures  there  are  “enough”  “irrational”  types.  (Since  the  set  of 
bounded-recall strategies is countable this is consistent with our restriction to a countable 
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number  of  types.)    Assumption  2  is  from  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1992]  who  call  it 
identifiability:  it means that regardless of the play of player 2 there is enough statistical 
information revealed by the outcomes to determine the action of player 1.  If it fails, 
player 2 may play an action that precludes him from learning what stage-game action 
player 1  is playing,  preventing  player 1  from developing a reputation, even when if 
player 2 is myopic . Note that the assumption is satisfied if player 1’s actions are perfectly 
observed, as in the previous papers on reputation effects with two long-run players.  
  Assumption  3  is  the  substantive  assumption:    It  says  that  player  2  cannot 
determine the set of possible outcomes through his own action.  If he could, then there are 
many counterexamples to the theorems below.  Note that this assumption does not require 
that player 1’s action be imperfectly observed, and indeed, whether player 1’s action is 
observed or not is irrelevant. 
  Assumption 4 says that there is a profile that is better for player 2 than the pure 
strategy minmax payoff.  If we used mixed strategies in place of pure, this would be a 
mild non-degeneracy condition:  failure would mean that the indifference of player 2 
might well make him immune to threats by player 1 .  We restrict attention to the pure 
strategy minmax in order to avoid the complications involved in maintaining a reputation 
for playing a mixed strategy.
8  The existence of a profile better for player 2 than the pure 
strategy minmax does rule out some interesting games, but the assumption is satisfied in 
other games of interest, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the battle of the sexes.. 
  Before analyzing reputation in our model, we calculate as a benchmark how much  
player 1  might hope to get by precommitting.  First we define a set of payoffs for player 
1.  This set has the feature that these payoffs can be approximated by  profiles in a finitely 
repeated version of the game, in which player two’s repeated game strategy is a best 
reponse to player 1’s in a finite truncation of the game. 
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Definition 1. v V 1 1 2 Î ( ) d  iff for every e >0 there is an  N and a pure strategys1
N in the N-
fold  repeated game such that if s2
N is a best response of player 2 with discount factor d 2 
in the N-fold repeated game then  ( / ) ( , ) 1 1 1 2
1





= ￿ ³ -  . 
Through precommitment (to a pure strategy) a patient player can guarantee himself 
v V 1 2 1 2 ( ) sup ( ) d d = .  Because we restrict attention to pure strategy commitment types, the 
worst punishment that player 1 can hope to “teach” player 2 to fear is the pure-strategy 
minimax;  this  restriction  on  punishments  can  result  in  a  lower  maximum  payoff  for 
player 1 than if mixed punishments were considered . 
3.  An Impatient Less Patient Player 
  Our main result is 
Theorem 1:  Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold.  Then liminf ( , ) ( ) d d d d
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 ® ³ N v . 
In other words, if player 1  is very patient then he gets nearly as much in any Nash 
equilibrium as the greatest amount consistent with the short run player choosing a best 
response in a finite truncation of the game. 
  The idea is that if player 1  commits to an appropriate  bounded recall strategy and 
player 2 plays a best response to it then player 1 gets a payoff very close to the  lower 
bound given above. Note that since the strategy has  bounded recall there are types of 
patient player who play these strategies regardless of the history.  In the usual reputational 
story, this would mean that if player 1  plays one of these review strategies, player 2 must 
either play a best response to it, or come to believe that he faces a committed type.  The 
situation here is complicated by the need to show that player 2 can learn the punishment 
strategy of player 1  without deviating:  this is where assumption 3 comes in.  
  We proceed via several lemmas.  Our initial focus is on the response of player 2 to 
these strategies in the N-fold repeated game. 
Lemma 1:   For every  h> 0 there exists an  N, , d e 1 1 0 < >  and pure type strategy for 
player 1  in the N-fold repeated game s1
N such that if  1 1 1 > ³ d d  and player 2 plays a e -
best response to s1
N the payoff to type w0  player 1  is at least v1 2 ( ) d h - .   8 
Proof: By definition, we can choose an N so that for some s1
N and for all s2
N which are a 
best response to s1
N in the N-fold repeated game we have  
(*)      ( / ) ( , ) / 1 3 1 1 2
1





= ￿ ³ -  
Moreover, since the e -best response correspondence is upper hemi-continuous in e , we 
may choose an e  so that ( / ) ( , ￿ ) / 1 2 3 1 1 2
1





= ￿ ³ -   for all e -best responses  ￿ s2
N.  
Moreover,  we  can  choose  d1 1 <   so  that  for  all  s 2
N  (best  response  or  not) 










t t N N
t
N
s s d d s s h
=
-
= ￿ ￿ - - < .  q 
If s
N is a profile consisting of a patient player type behavior strategy and a less patient 
player strategy in the N-fold repeated game, let p
N ( ) s  be the probability distribution over 
N-length sequences of public outcomes induced by r.  Notice that this is a finite vector.  
Lemma 2:  For any e > 0, N  there exists a g > 0 such that in the N-fold repeated game if 
p p
N N N N ( , ) (￿ , ) s s s s g 1 2 1 2 - <  and s2
N is a e -best response by player 2 to s1
N then it is a 
2e-best response to ￿ s1
N.
9 
Proof:  We identify type behavior strategies by player 1  that differ only at information 
sets  that  are  unreachable  given  that  strategy.    It  is  sufficient  to  show  that 
p p
N N N N (￿ , ) ( , ) s s s s 1 2 1 2 ®  implies  ￿ s s 1 1
N N ® .  This in turn will follow if  p
N ( , ) × s2  has a 
continuous inverse.  Since the domain of  p
N ( , ) × s2  is compact, the image of a closed set is 
closed, so it suffices to show that  p
N ( , ) × s2  is continuous and 1-1.   Continuity is obvious.  
Suppose in fact that    p p
N N N N (￿ , ) ( , ) s s s s 1 2 1 2 = , but that s s 1 1
N N , ￿  are not equivalent.  Let 
( , , ) h h h 1 2   be a triple consisting of a public and private histories (of the same length) 
possible  under  s1
N  such  that  ~ ( , ) ( , ) s s 1 1 1 1
N N h h h h ¹ .    By  Assumption  2  it  follows  that 
r s s r s s (~ ( , ), ( , )) ( ( , ), ( , )) 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
N N N N h h h h h h h h ¹ .  Since h has positive probability under 
s1
N  for  some  ￿ s2
N  by  Assumption  3  it  has  positive  probability  under  s s 1 2
N N ,   (and  by 
hypothesis  the  same  probability  under  ￿ s s 1 2
N N , ).    This  contradicts 
p p
N N N N (￿ , ) ( , ) s s s s 1 2 1 2 = .  q 
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  We  will  refer  to  the  N-fold  repeated game as the superstage game.  Fixing a 
strategy for all types of more patient player, let  M K ( ) be the finite set of probability 
distributions over types of more patient player that can be generated by Bayesian updating 
with no more than K observations of more patient player play. 
Lemma 3:  Suppose the more patient player strategy in the infinitely repeated superstage 
game is such that type w0  plays s1
N in each  superstage game.  In any of the superstage 
games, let  ￿ ( ' ) s m 1
N  be the conditional probability of different pure strategies according to 
the beliefs of player 2, when his prior beliefs over more patient player types is m' .  For 
every l g > > 0 0 , ,K  there is an  L such that if m' ( ) ÎM K  the probability is less than l 
that there are more than L superstage games with  p p
N N N N ( , ) (￿ ( ' ), ) s s s m s g 1 2 1 2 - ³ . 
Proof:  This is a restatement of Theorem 4.1 in Fudenberg and Levine [1992].  q 
Proof of Theorem 1:  For any number h> 0 we may choose  N, , d e 1 1 0 < > ,s1
N so that  
Lemma 1 is satisfied for the tolerance h / 4. 
  The idea is to consider what happens when the more patient player repeatedly 
plays s1
N and player 2 plays a best response.  Our conclusion follows by demonstrating 
that the more patient player is more patient than d1 he gets at least v1 2 ( ) d h -  .    
  To  analyze  the  best  response  of  player  2,  we  fix  any  number  m  so  that 
d e d
m
2 2 2 2 1 4
N u u (max min ) ( ) / - < - .  We refer to the game consisting of m repetitions 
of the superstage game (and mN  repetitions of the stage game) as the superduperstage 
game.  Apply Lemma 2 to any superduperstage game where the tolerance is e d ( ) / 1 2 2 -  
to find a value for g . Apply Lemma 3 to the repeated superduperstage game using this 
value of g  as the tolerance level for beliefs, choosing the probability l that this tolerance 
level is exceeded to be such that l h (max min ) / u u 1 1 4 - < , and choosing K N = m .  We 
refer to superduperstage games in which the tolerance is exceeded as anomalous. 
  Player 2 is playing at worst an  e d ( ) / 1 2 2 -  best response to his beliefs in the 
superduperstage game, since  d e d
m
2 2 2 2 1 4
N u u (max min ) ( ) / - < - .  By Lemma 2 (except 
in the anomalous case) player 2 is playing an  e d /( ) 1 2 -  best response to the  m-fold 
repetition of s1
N.  Consequently, player 2 is playing an e -best response to s1
N in the first 
of the superstage games of the superduperstage game.  By Lemma 1, in the first of the   10 
superstage  games  of  a  non-anomalous  superduperstage  game  player  1    gets  at  least 
v1 2 2 ( ) / d h - .   
  Taking  account  of  the  probability  l    that  there  are  more  than  L  anomalous 
superduperstage games and the probability 1- l that there are less than or equal to L , we 
conclude  the  more  patient  player  gets  an  expected  average  present  value  of  at  least 
d d h d
m m
1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1
NL NL v u ( ( ) / ) ( )min - + -   in  all  first  stages  of  all  superduperstage games 
combined.     
  Now  consider  the  infinitely  repeated  game  beginning  in  any  period 
k k m N + £ £ - 1 1 1 , .  This is identical to the game that begins in period 1, except that 
the prior of player 2 may have changed.  We may organize this game also into superstage 
and superduperstage games, and since Lemma 3 applies to all priors reachable during 
periods up to  mN  the previous argument shows that the more patient player receives an 
expected average present value of at least   d d h d
m m
1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1
NL NL v u ( ( ) / ) ( )min - + -  in the 
first  stages  of  these  superduperstage  games.    However,  the  first  stage  of  one  of  the 
superduperstage games in the game beginning in period kN +1 is stage k of one of the 
superduperstage games in the game beginning in period 1, so we average over all stages 
of the superduperstage games beginning in period 1 to conclude that the more patient 
player  receives  an  expected  average  present  value  of  
d d h d
m m
1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1
NL NL v u ( ( ) / ) ( )min - + -  for the entire game.   Letting d1 1 ®  now gives 
the desired result.  q 
4.  A Patient Less Patient Player 
  We now investigate what happens as d2 1 ® . Our second theorem shows that if 
we consider a patient less patient player then player 1  can essentially achieve a payoff 
that is equal to the maximum he can get while giving player 2 his minmax payoff.  Note 
that this bound is derived by taking a particular order of limits. First, we derive a lower 
bound on player 1 ' s payoff, when this player is arbitrarily patient. Then we ask how this 
bound behaves as also player 2 becomes very patient. Implicit in this construction is that 
player 1  is always infinitely more patient than player 2. (If we reverse the order of limits, 
then the result does not hold.)     11 
  Let  V
* denote the convex hull of feasible payoffs that are at least as great as the 
pure strategy minmax.  By  V1
* we denote the projection of  V
* onto the payoffs of player 
1. 
Theorem 2:  Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then  
liminf liminf ( , ) max
*
d d d d
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ® ® ³ N V  
Before turning to the proof, it is worth noting that if we allowed types of player 2 as well 
as types of patient player, this result would remain valid, and the proof of this result (and 
Theorem 1 from which it follows) would involve only notational changes.  However, we 
cannot turn the theorem around and use the fact that there are types of less patient player 
to find a bound on his payoffs similar to that for player 1 :  the validity of Theorem 2 
depends  crucially  on  the  order  of  limits.    As  we  make  player  2  increasingly  patient, 
Theorem 2 allows (and in fact requires) us to make player 1  even more patient. 
  Note also that the definition of V
*makes use of the pure strategy minmax.  As was 
argued in Section 2, we only allow player 1  to establish a reputation for pure strategy, 
since  allowing  him  to  establish  a  reputation  for  mixed  strategy  punishments  would 
require the existence of a continuum of types that would make the notation significantly 
heavier. Our pure strategy definition implies that max
* V1  is the largest socially feasible 
and individually rational payoff for player 1 , if player 2' s pure strategy minmax payoff is 
equal  to  his  mixed  strategy  minmax  payoff.    If  we  allowed  a  reputation  for  mixed 
strategies, we could use the usual socially feasible individually rational set, and replace 
the inequality  in Theorem 2 with an equality. 
  The  proof  of  Theorem  2  is  an  immediate  consequence  of  Theorem  1  and  the 
following Lemma. 
Lemma  4.  For  any  v v v = ( , ) 1 2   with  v V Îint
*  there  is  a  d 2  such  that  for  d d 2 2 >  
v V 1 1 2 Î ( ) d . 
Remark:  We  should  emphasize  that  this  lemma  concerns  the  complete  information 
game, where reputation plays no role. The lemma is thus more closely related to the 
literature on repeated games than to that on reputation effects, and indeed our proof uses 
"review strategies" of the sort introduced in Radner' s [1981], [1985] study of repeated 
agency  games,  and  subsequently  used  in  a  number  of  papers  on  the  folk  theorem  in   12 
repeated games. Despite this close link to the repeated game literature, the lemma we 
need does not seem to be a direct consequence of previous work, so we give a complete 
proof here. 







1 = ( ,..., ) be a sequence of actions by 
player 1 such that there is a sequence of actions for player 2 such that in the N-times 
repeated game the expected average payoff of player 1 is larger than v1 2 -e /  and the 
expected average payoff of player 2 is larger thanv2. (Clearly for N sufficiently large such 
a sequence exists.)  
  Consider the KMN-fold repeated game in which player two has the time average 
payoff as a payoff function. In the following we call each MN-fold repetition of the game 
a superstage game, and hence we consider a K-fold repetition of the superstage game. 
Denote by 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
a a a 1 1 1 = ( ,..., ) the sequence of M repetitions of
￿
a1. Let a1 be a (pure) action of 
player 1  that minmaxes the payoff of player 2 in pure strategies.  Further, let u
k
1  denote 
player 1' s average payoff in the k-th superstagegame. 
  Let 
￿ ￿
s1 be the following strategy: in the first superstage game, player 1  chooses
￿ ￿
a1.  
In the second superstage game, ifv u 1 1
2 2 - - < e h / , then player 1  again chooses 
￿ ￿
a1 and so 
on. If for any superstage game, v u
k
1 1 2 - - > e h / , then player 1  plays action a1 for the 
next P repetitions of the superstage game. 
  Claim: Givene > 0 there are numbersh, K, N, M, and P with  P K / < e such that 





(i) prob v u
k { } 1 1 1 - < > - e efor all superstage games k K P = ,..., - 1  for which player 1 
chooses 
￿ ￿
a1 (i.e., for all superstage games for which player 1 does not use his punishment 
strategy.) 
(ii) the fraction of superstage games in which player 1 uses his punishment strategy is 
smaller than e  with probability ( ) 1-e .   
  Assuming for the moment the truth of the claim, a straightforward upper hemi-
continuity argument shows that the claim remains true if 
￿ ￿
s2 is discounted best response 
with d2 sufficiently close to 1.  Moreover, the claim implies that the average payoff to 
player 1  in the KMN-fold repeated game is greater than v C 1 - e  where C is a positive 
constant independent of e .  This is the desired result.    13 
  To demonstrate the validity of the claim, first chooseh e b < +
2 1 /( ), where b is a 
fixed constant whose computation is described below.   
  Denote by Euk
1 the expected payoff of player 1 in superstagegame k. Given K and 
h we can choose M sufficiently large, so that  
(a)  if  v Eu
k
1 1 2 2 - - > e h /   in  any  superstage  game  then  punishment  occurs  with 
probability greater than ( ) 1- h ;  
(b) if v Eu
k
1 1 2 - - < e h /  for all k, then the probability that no punishment occurs in any 
superstagegame is larger than ( ) 1- h . 
  Note that the utility loss from a punishment is bounded below by  ( ) v u P 2 2 - , 
(v u 2 2 0 - > ), whereas the gain from a deviation is bounded above byu u 2 2 - , where u2 is 
the largest attainable payoff for player 2 in the stage game. Thus for appropriate choice of 
P we have  
(*)                     v Eu
k
1 1 2 2 - - < e h /  
in all of the first K P -  superstage games for any best response of player 2 and hence part 
(i) of  the claim follows. 
  Now we establish part (ii) of the claim.  Suppose to the contrary that  player 2' s 
(optimal) strategy triggers a punishment in more than an  e  fraction of the first  K P -  
superstage  games  with  probability  greater  thane .    We  claim  that  this  implies  that  a 
profitable deviation exists. Suppose player 2 deviates so that v Eu
k
1 1 2 - - < e h /  for all 
k=1,..., K P - . Since  (*) has to be satisfied in every superstagegame k K P = - 1,...,  this 
deviation can be chosen so that the loss in every superstagegame is bounded above by hB 
(where  B  is  a  constant  that  depends  only  on  the  payoff  matrix).  Note  that  (after  the 
deviation)  the  probability  that  a  punishment  occurs  in  any  superstagegame  is  smaller 
thanh. Thus player 2 also improves his average payoff over the first  K P -  superstage 
games  by  at  least  ( )( ) e h
2
2 2 - - × v u P  by  reducing  the  probability  of  punishment.  
Consequently, if we choose b = - × B v u P /( ) 2 2  player 2 gains from the deviation and part 
(ii) of the claim follows.   ￿   14 
 
5. An Example 
SAVING FN
10   
This example thus shows that the conclusion of theorem 1 below fails with perfectly  
observable actions, even if the equilibrium concept is strengthened.





                                                 
10 Although sequential equilibrium has not beed defined for infinite games, in the finitely repeated versions 
of  the two-types example considered here perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and sequential equilibria 
coincide (Fudenberg-Tirole [1991] We use the simpler  PBE concept because its conditions on beleifs are 
easier to check.  
11 However,  since for a fixed d 2 the example requires an upper bound on the probability that 1 is the 
commitment type,   it  is not a counterexample to the strengthened version of  theorem 2.   
12 Moreover this example is robust to small changes in payoffs, and 1 cannot obtain the Stackelberg payoff 
by commitment to a mixed strategy.  We thank a referee for finding an error in a previous example, and for 
encouarging us to find a robust example.   15 
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